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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF AGENCY,
PARTNERSHIPS AND CORPORATIONS
By

GERALD

H. KOPEL*

Real estate brokers, a mining prospector, officers of a large
corporation, an attorney who drank too much, and a lady on an
operating table combined to make this an interesting year in the
field of Business Associations.
AGENCY

A. Real Estate Brokers
In Nunnally v. Hilderman,' the supreme court affirmed the
fact that the English language does not always have the same meaning in law as it does to the layman. Here was considered the authority of a bank, acting as agent, "to sell" real estate. The principal
contended the bank had no authority to bind the principal to convey, and the supreme court agreed.
The Colorado Statute of Frauds provides that every instrument
required to be subscribed by any party for the sale of real estate
may be subscribed by the agent of such party, lawfully authorized
2
in writing.
Written instructions in general terms, "to sell" real estate, when
placed in the hands of an agent confer authority upon the agent
only to produce a purchaser to buy upon terms offered by the principal.' The agent has no authority over the title "unless he is specifically authorized in writing to bind the title or to enter into a contract binding the owner to convey the title '4 or "to execute an eyecutory contract for the sale of real estate." As a special agent, or
an agent with specific authority to deal in real estate, "any person
dealing with him is bound at his peril to learn the extent of that
authority. ' 6 The supreme court held that the agent was given no
such specific authority in writing under the evidence presented, nor
was there any ratification of the acts of the bank by the principal
based upon knowledge of all material facts.7
In Garrett v. Richards,S real estate broker was granted a written, exclusive, irrevocable right for a specified period of time to
sell owner's home. The agreement, accepted in writing by broker,
provided that in case of sale by owner, broker, or any person during
the period of the listing, broker would be entitled to his commission.
Broker advertised the property and expended other efforts to produce a sale. Owner notified broker to take the property off the market because he had decided not to sell. Broker, within the specified
Member of the Denver firm of Kopel and Kopel.
1 373 P.2d 940 (Colo. 1962).
2 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 59-1.8, -9 (1953).
.2 Springer v. City Bank and Trust Co., 59 Colo. 376, 149 Pac 253 (1915).
-1 Stark v. Rogers, 69 Colo. 98, 106, 169 Pac. 146, 148 (1917).
5 Johnson v. Lennox, 55 Colo. 125, 129, 133 Pac 744, 746 (1913).
6 Id. at 130, 133 Pac. at 746.
7 Even though the principal stated in a letter that she was agreeable to a sale to purchaser for
the specified price, the letter stated further that principal "does not know the contents of the agreement entered into between" bank and purchaser. "Please advise what was contracted for . . . and
what is customary under similar circumstances." 373 P.2d 940, 943 (Colo. 1962).
S 369 P.2d 566 (Colo. 1962).
*
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period of time, then produced a buyer ready, willing and able to
buy upon terms set forth in the listing. Owner refused to sell. Is
the owner liable to broker for the amount of commission broker
would have received if the sale had taken place? The supreme court
said yes, in a decision which establishes definite Colorado rules concerning irrevocable listings.
The issue is whether an "irrevocable" contract is binding, and
whether it is revocable. Owner maintained the contract was "nudum pactum," unilateral and unenforceable as an executory contract because of lack of consideration as of the time he notified
broker to take the property off the market. The court agreed that
the contract was not binding "until some service is rendered by the
broker looking to the sale of the property."9 It becomes binding
"when the broker expends money or performs services in furtherance of his own and the owners' purposes," 10 stated the court. This
partial performance of the main consideration, which is the sale,
is sufficient to make the contract binding. Another factor considered by the court is that the exclusive, irrevocable contract must
be for a reasonable specified time.11
This decision, while justifiable and equitable from the viewpoint of the broker,' 2 might be considered contrary to the general
spirit of principal-agency law concerning irrevocable agencies. We
are not speaking of the right of a broker to receive his commission
upon the production of a buyer, or to sue for damages, but rather
of the power of a principal to terminate an agency. The principal,
in an ordinary agency, always has the power, though not the legal
right to fire an agent. The principal is, of course, liable in damages
if the firing is not justified under the terms of the contract. But if
the agency is irrevocable,
then the principal has no power to termi13
nate the agency.
Certainly there can be no dispute with the court's con'ention
that the expending of money or performance of service made this
contract one that was binding and enforceable for purposes of a
suit for damages. The question remains as to whether the incurring
of expenses in and about the business of the agency, under terms
of a contract such as this one, should bar the power (as it bars the
right) of the seller to revoke the contract.
An irrevocable agency is not normally terminated by death or
other operations of law which terminate an ordinary agency.1 4
Query: Does this mean that an individual broker, operating under
the Garrett rule, may die before the end of a specified time limitation of the irrevocable contract and that his estate may complete
the contract and obtain the commission?
In City of Pueblo v. Leach Realty Co.,' 5 the defendant city,
having some old airport land to sell, appointed all licensed real
9 Id. at 568.
10 Ibid.
11 The listing was from January 31 to April 31, and then extended to May 31. Buyer was
produced on May 27.
12 The court differentiates Garrett v. Richardson from Lambert v. Hoskins, 128 Colo. 473, 263 P.2d
433 (1953). In the Lambert case, an exclusive agency to sell did not eliminate a sale by the owner
himself, and there was no liability to the broker for a commission if owner sold. The exclusive
agency only forbade the sale by another agent, without a commission going to broker. The language in the Garrett contract was such that a commission was due broker no matter who sold
the property.
13 12 C.J.S. Brokers, Section 16b, p. 46.
14 12 C.J.S. Brokers, Section 16c, p. 49.
15 368 P.2d 195 (Colo. 1962).
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estate brokers in the city as its non-exclusive sales agents. Plaintiff
submitted what amounted to an acceptance of the city's terms and
conditions for purchase of the entire tract by plaintiff's client. On
the same day, but apparently at a later hour, another broker submitted an offer to purchase. The second offer, combined with a third
offer of another firm made at a later date, was accepted by the city
council.
Plaintiff sued for his commission, and was awarded $17,535.
The supreme court approved the jury verdict, holding that the
transaction with plaintiff's client "failed only because the defendant
failed and refused to perform its part of the agreement and not because of any act of the broker or purchaser. If a seller does not perform once a qualified buyer is produced by his broker the seller
cannot escape the payment of the agreed commission. '""
The court cites 12 CJS Brokers, Section 92, page 213: "Where
several independent brokers are employed to effect the same transaction, only one commission is to be paid and that is to be paid in
full to the broker
who first succeeds and is the procuring cause of
T
the 'ransaction."
B. Notice and Knowledge
There is a general rule in agency law, subject to some exceptions, that notice or knowledge of an agent is notice or knowledge
of his principal. The Colorado Supreme Court, however, has held
that this is not necessarily true, depending on who the agent is.
Thus, in Zika v. Eckel,s notice of a trial setting upon attorney for
the defendant, as provided by Colo. R. Civ. P. 5(b) (1), was not
considered sufficient notice to the defendant "where it is generally
known by both the bench and the bar of the county that the whereabouts of the party's attorney is frequently, and for extended periods of time, unknown, and that the absences from his work are
many times the result of his excessive drinking .

.

.

."". In

such a

situation, the court should order service upon the defendant, states
the supreme court.
Clients of real estate agents do not fare as well, as shown by
2"
Dunklee v. Lederman..
The seller-client of real estate broker approved an offer of purchase on December 9, 1962. Testimony at trial
indica'ed that buyer notified broker on December 8, 1962, that the
offer was withdrawn. Even if the trial testimony was disputed,
broker had knowledge of the withdrawal of offer when he presented
buyer's check for certification and was notified that payment had
been stopped. Seller-client did not have actual knowledge of the
withdrawal of the offer at the time of acceptance, but because broker "had knowledge of the fact . . . his knowledge was imputable

to his principal in law if' ' not in fact, and as such the purported acceptance was a nullity."'
16 Id. at 196.
17 Other real estate agent cases decided in 1962 were Leece v. Griffin, 371 P.2d 264 (Colo.
1962) (statement of a real estate salesman in answer to a question by a proposed purchaser as to
income, was a mere prediction of future income, and the fact that such prediction did not prove
cccurcte was not a basis for maintenance of a fraud action); and Cherry Creek Realty Inc. v.
Amter, 368 P.2d 787 (Colo. 1962) (commissions are paid for achievement, not effort).
tS 372 P.2d 165 (Colo. 1962).
I . Ibid.
2': 374 P.2d 699 (Colo. 1962).
21 Id. at 701.
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C. Unlawful Interference with Agency by Third Person
Settlemeyer sued Watson 2 2 for unlawful interference by Watson
with Settlemeyer's oral distributorship contract
for Colorado,
23
granted by Bardahl Manufacturing Corporation..
Watson, who was Bardahl's New Mexico distributor, replaced
Settlemeyer in Colorado under a written contract which contained
several provisions concerning the ouster of Settlemeyer.
The evidence showed Watson had visited the Bardahl offices
just prior to Settlemeyer's termination, and that Watson had previously attempted to trade distributorship areas with Settlemeyer.
During his period as Colorado distributor, Settlemeyer had spent
large sums to advertise and promote Bardahi, and at the time of his
ouster, he had a considerable stock of Bardahl products and promotional materials on hand.
Watson claimed the oral contract between Settlemeyer and
Bardahl was terminable at will, and therefore no possible damages
could accrue. The supreme court conceded the possibility, without
deciding the issue, that Bardahl might have had the right to terminate the contract at will. 24 But even so, stated the court in uphold-

ing the $7,500 damage award to Settlemeyer, "Watson had no right
to induce such an act or to intentionally interfere . . .by promoting

his purpose and intention to take over if Bardahl was successful in
ousting Settlemeyer. ' -. " ... independent contractors or agents ...
have the right to earn a livelihood and to continue their business
unmolested by unwarranted activities of third persons and are entitled 26to protection in equity just like the employees of any business."
There has been an extremely large increase in the number of
exclusive franchise contracts held by businessmen in Colorado dur22 Watson v. Settlemeyer, 372 P.2d 453 (Colo. 1962).
23 Settlemeyer had attempted to sue Bardahl also, on the basis of alleged conspiracy to breach
the oral distributorship contract. However, Bardahl was a foreign corporation which was not doing
business in Colorado, according to the court's decision. Settlemeyer attempted to gain jurisdiction
by serving Bardahl's counsel, who was present as both counsel and witness for Watson, at Watson's trial. The supreme court held that service on an attorney in open court, or on an attorney
appearing specially in a state, is improper unless the attorney has been specifically authorized by
his client to accept service. Further, general employment as an attorney is not sufficient grounds
to serve his client by serving the attorney. (Bardahl Manufacturing Corp. v. District Court, 372
P.2d 447 (Cola. 1962). For another case on what constitutes "transacting or doing business" within
Colorado for purposes of obtaining jurisdiction by service on the secretary of state under CRS
31-35-19(3), see Bay Aviation Services v. District Court, 370 P.2d 752 (Colo. 1962).
"4 " ...
Settlemeyer's accounts with Bardahl were becoming delinquent and Bardahl was be.
coming dissatisfied with Settlcmeyer." 372 P.2d 453, 455.
25 Id. at 456.
26 Ibid.

1963

AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS AND CORPORATIONS

ing the past decade, and the cases cited by the supreme court in
reaching this decision should be required reading for any attorney
dealing in this field of law.
D.

Liability for the Torts of Others

In Industrial Comm'n v. Standard Ins. Co.,2

7

plaintiff was em-

ployed as a roughneck. While so employed he sustained an accidental injury to his left arm, breaking a bone in the area of his wrist.
He was treated for this injury by a physician selected by the employer. The treatment resulted in a marked deformity of plaintiff's
left wrist requiring further operative procedure. The court held that
in Colorado, under our Workmen's Compensation Act, the employer
is liable for the unskillfulness or error of judgment of the physician
furnished as required.
In Moon v. Mercy Hospital,2s however, plaintiff sought to recover damages from Mercy Hospital for an alleged injurious tort.
The complaint alleged that Mercy employed a resident surgeon who
carelessly and negligently diagnosed, treated and operated on plaintiff, and that Mercy was responsible for the resultant damages. The
district court dismissed the action as one not stating a claim upon
which relief could be granted, and the supreme court upheld the
decision. The court's logic is that a hospital is not licensed to practice medicine; the relationship between doctor and patient is personal; the hospital is powerless to command or forbid any act by a
doctor in the practice of his profession; the hospital is not liable
unless it employs those whose want of skill is known, or should be
known to it, or by some special conduct or neglect the hospital
makes itself responsible for their malpractice.
It is the import of our decisions that a licensed physician is the principal when performing medical services in a
hospital. When a doctor diagnoses, treats and operates on a
patient in a hospital, he is in command of these functions,
and the hospital and its employees subserve him in his ministrations to the patient. He has sole and final control ....29
Plaintiff made one fatal error. She should have been an employee of Mercy Hospital, injured on the job. Then Mercy would
have been liable. Perhaps the distinction between the two cases
makes sense under the statutes of our state, but certainly the results appear inequitable. Query: Does our supreme court really believe that a patient has any choice in the selection of a resident
doctor on duty at a hospital?'
27 370 P.2d 156 (Colo. 1962).
2s 373 P.2d 944 (Colo. 1962).
21 Id. at 945, 946.
:30Agency cases of minor import in 1962 were Parent v. Kopanos, 368 P.2d 784 (Colo. 1962) (could
be construed to state that covenants of employees not to compete are not transferable by inference
upon employer's sole of the business even though the seller might remain a third-party benefiiciary
of such covenant); San Miguel Basin State Bank v. Finch, 369 P.2d 544 (Cola. 1962) (small "family"
bark, acting as escrow agent was held liable for wrongful distribution of funds received. The
sspreme court, in effect, held bank for acts of its president acting within his actual and apparent
authority. Bank had clecred a debt owing to it by the wrongful distribution); Armour and Co. v.
Peterson, 371 P.2d 770 Colo. 1962) (defendant was not liable to contractor's employee for injuries
sustained when employee used defendant's machine to remove employee's tools after completion
of job, where employee knew that machine was not in good working condition and defendant had
not given employee permission to use the machine); and Berry v. American Liberty Ins. Co., 375
P.2d 93, 96 (Colo. 1962) " . . . the doctrine of estoppel cannot be invoked against any governmental agency acting in its public capacity
. . were it otherwise, the state's servans could waive
most of her revenue."
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CORPORATIONS

A. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
The president of American Founders Life Insurance Company
of Denver, caused the issuance of 24,000 shares of the corporation's
common stock to three individuals in return for 58,750 shares of
Texas Adams Oil Company stock. One year after the swap, the oil
company was adjudged a bankrupt and was defunct. The 24,000
shares of American were valued at $1.60 per share, or $38,400 total.
The oil company stock was finally sold for $1,000, leaving a $37,400
deficit which was assessed by the trial court against defendants
jointly and severally, under suit brought by plaintiff, American
Founders.
The supreme court decided the president's writ of error in Hudson v. American Founders Life Ins. Co. of Denver.3' There was no
question as to the fiduciary duty owed by officers and directors of
corporations under Colorado law; the question was whether a duty
was breached.
The president caused the stock issuance. He signed the certificates knowing they were being issued in exchange for Texas
Adams; he admitted and assumed full responsibility in the minutes
of the shareholders meeting of March 12, 1957 (about the time that
Texas Adams went bankrupt). Issuance of the stock breached the
"underwriting agreement" of plaintiff with Colorado Management
Corporation, the firm which was to sell the stock for cash. The president did not bring up the transaction at any regular or special board
meeting, but did do so at an informal discussion among Colorado
Management officials, some of whom consented to waive the provisions of the underwriting agreement, provided the Texas Adams
stock was sold and converted into cash before issuance of stock in
the plaintiff corporation.
The president went ahead with the stock exchange. Eleven
months (and nine meetings of plaintiff corporation) later, he discussed the Texas Adams swap with the board of directors of plaintiff. The supreme court said:
Hudson personally caused the issuance [of stock] ...
of plaintiff corporation, not only without authority from
the board of directors but without any information being
imparted to the board . . . until eleven months after the

Texas Adams transactions had been completed. Suffice it
to say that such evidence is sufficient to establish violation
of the duties and obligations of the presidency
which also
2
carried with it management of the company'
One of the defenses was ratification of the Texas Adams transaction by plaintiff's board of directors at subsequent annual meetings of stockholders. The supreme court referred to the rule set
forth in Colorado Management Corp. v. American Founders Life
Ins. Co., 33 to the effect that stockholders' approval of all lawful acts

does not constitute ratification of acts which the law regards as
unlawful or invalid.
In Holland v. American Founders Life Ins. Co. of Denver,3 4 the
31 377 P.2d 391 (Colo 1962).
42 Id. at 395.
:13 145 Colo. 413, 359 P.2d 665, more fully set forth in 39 Dicta 74-75 (1962).
34 376 P.2d 162 (Colo. 1962).
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supreme court held that the secretary was not liable, jointly or
severally, with the president for the $37,400. While the secretary did
sign his name and affix the corporate seal on the share certificates
to the three individuals, his duties in doing so were ministerial only,
the supreme court stated, and his "performance of his duties as
secretary and his conduct as a director was not a contributing cause
of the loss sustained . . . .
A director and officer of a business corporation is
liable for his own misconduct and not for the wrongful conduct of other directors or officers unless he joined with
them in perpetrating the wrong. The directors ...

are not to

be held responsible for mere errors of judgment or for want
of prudence short of clear and gross negligence."'
B. Equitable Ownership of Stock Certificates
In Arfsten v. Higby,3 7 the supreme court decided that the Uniform Stock Transfer Act3-' does not prevent the equitable owner of
stock certificates in a corporation from bringing an action against
the corporation, where the allegation of stock ownership is necessary for the litigation. The court stated:
We construe the sections involved" ' as dealing with
legal titles, and conclude that the statute clearly recognizes
the existence of equitable or beneficial ownerships or interests in shares of stock. The Act does not purport to do
away with such ownerships or interests ....

Indeed, a con-

struction against such ownership
or interest would cast
4
doubt on the validity of the Act. '

Stock certificates of the plaintiff were never properly endorsed
by the person appearing to be the owner; there was no delivery by
that person; and no separate instrument signed by the person appearing to be the owner. The court affirms that any equitable ownership based upon those facts could not be recognized when the
rights of third parties are present who might otherwise be misled.
35 Id. at 165.
36 Id. at 165, 166.
37 372 P.2d 166 (Colo. 1962).
38 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 31-9-1 to -22 (1953).
39 The court stated that Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-9-1 (1953) "Title to a certificate can be transferred
only" must be read in connection with § 31-9-21, subsections (h) andd (ii): "(h) 'Transfer' means
transfer of legal title. (i) 'Title' means legal title and does not include a merely equitable or
beneficial ownership or interest." 372 P.2d 166, 168.
4" Id. at 168, 169.
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But majority stockholders and corporate officers are not "third
parties" within the protective coverage of that term.
This was the first interpretation by the court of the effect of
the present Uniform Stock Transfer Act on equitable titles in shares
of stock, although prior decisions 41 under prior acts held
4 an enforceable status for the holder of an equitable title to stock.
PARTNERSHIPS

A. Capital Contributions
Reducing Reidel v. Brant43 to its simplest terms, we have the
following: Six weeks after formation, a partnership has a $65,000
operating loss. Following judgment by a creditor, partners A, B, and
C agree to dissolution, winding up and termination under auspices
of the court. The partnership articles provide for a 6-2-2 profit-loss
ratio. Partner A was to have supplied $60,000 as the total capital
for the business. B and C contend that A only supplied $48,000 and
that B and C are damaged to the full extent of any amounts that
might be their contribution to make up losses sustained. B and C
claim they are in no manner further obligated to partner A or the
partnership. The trial court agreed. The supreme court disagreed.
The supreme court held the evidence showed partner A had
contributed more than the total required capital of $60,000. Even if
partner A had not, the court stated in what amounts to dictum, parners B and C would still not be relieved of their duty of contribution towards the partnership losses, since there was no proof that B
and C suffered any damages by reason of A's failure to supply the
full capital.
This ruling appears equitable under the commercial maxim
"don't throw good money after bad." This dictum, however, might
afford dangerous solace to a cautious member of any partnership
who withholds needed capital. It is hoped that the court's ruling
will not be interpre t ed as a general sanction for such practice, but
merely a justifiable decision based upon particular facts.
In Thompson v. McCormick, 4 we find the unusual situation of
a plaintiff entitled to claim three million dollars without ever hav-

41 Carlton v. Cornfield, 64 Co!o. 373, 171 Pac. 1140 (1918); Weber v. Bullock, 19 Colo. 214, 75
183 (1894).
42 Other 1962 cases dealing with corporations are Colorado So. Pet. Corp. v. Stone, 369 P.2d
438 (Colo. 1962) (corporation has burden of proving corporate president violated fiduciary duty);
and Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 374 P.2d 691 (Colo. 1962) (the tribe, by adopting incorporation
under 25 U.S.C.A. § 476 and consenting to sue and be sued in courts of competent jurisdiction
within the United States, has rendered itself amenable to the courts of the State of Colorado in
any action of which the state courts may take cognizance. Reservation of the tribe is in La
Plot, and Archuleta counties, Colorado).
4: 368 P.2d 771 (Colo. 1962).
44 370 P.2d 442 (Colo. 1962).
Pac.
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ing placed one cent into partnership funds. Defendant individually
leased mining claims from the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. He
then entered into an agreement which provided that plaintiff was
Mines and that plaintiff "is
to be a silent partner in McCormick
depositing . . . ten thousand dollars ' 45 to the enterprise's bank acwas
count. Profits and losses were to be shared equally. Defendant
46
to be manager and "in the eyes of the public, sole owner.
Plaintiff and defendant co-signed notes totalling $10,000 in return for cash loan to the enterprise's account. Profits of $41,000
were divided until there was a "falling-out" about a year after the
agreement was entered into. Defendant then denied that a partnership had ever existed.
Trial was to the court seven years after plaintiff's original complaint for appointment of a receiver and an accounting. The supreme court reversed the lower court's judgment for the defendant.
The main issue was whether the $10,000 deposit as a fixed capital contribution was a condition precedent to the formation of the
partnership, assuming the co-signing of notes for that amount was
not the $10,000 contemplated by defendant. The court said:
* * ' the failure by a partner to contribute his share of
capital does not necessarily negative the existence of a partnership. Such failure may be waived by the other partner,
where as here following execution of the agreement, I deI authorized and made payments of profits to plainfendant
47
tiff.

The agreement entered into, according to the court, "clearly
embodies every element necessary for the formation and creation
of a partnership, and when it was executed by the parties nothing
to be done to legally bring about a partnership
further remained
''4
relation . 8
"The intention of the parties and their interpretation of the
contract before controversy arises is one of the best indications of
their true intent."4 ' Once a partnership is found to exist, the fact
one partner has failed to make the required capital contribution "is
no reason to impose a forfeiture when the contribution can be deducted from his share of the profits.""'
Defendant also contended that the partnership was void as
against public policy because the Atomic Energy Commission leases
to individuals only. But the supreme court agreed that so long as
defendant was the sole operator of the lease and the partners only
divided the proceeds, there was no violation of the government
lease.5
45 Id. at 443.
46 Ibid.

47 Id. at 446.
48 Id. at 445.
41) Id. at 445, 446.

50 Id. at 446.
5 1 For another

case construing

Bear v. Bear, 377 P.2d 538 (Colo.

government

1962).

mineral
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where

a

partnership

The case deals with rights under

ment and also affirms the rule that partnership business partly
owned by one partner does not make it partnership property.
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One case on joint adventure is Garrett v. Kimbrel, 376 P.2d 376 (Colo.
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1962).
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Whether parties

are engaged in joint adventure is question of fact to be determined from facts and circumstances
but it is sufin evidence, and it is not necessary that there be shown specific, formal agreement,

ficient if it be shown by parties' conduct and other factors from which it is made to appear that
relalonship in fact was entered into. Acts and conduct of parties in furtherance of their purposes
to form

joint adventure may
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declaraions to contrary.

